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FRAUD ON THE MARKET GETS A MINITRIAL: 
EISEN THROUGH IN RE IPO  
PATRICIA GROOT† 
ABSTRACT 
  Securities class actions involve contested pretrial hearings to 
determine the proper class of plaintiffs. The certification decision 
often affects the outcome of a case because defendants usually settle if 
the class is certified, whereas plaintiffs usually abandon the case 
without trial if certification is denied. Courts disagree, however, over 
the appropriate class certification procedure. Courts that emphasize 
efficiency invoke Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin to preclude 
considering substantive issues during the pretrial hearing. Courts that 
emphasize the importance of determining the correct class during the 
pretrial stage follow General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. 
Falcon and allow parties to introduce evidence going to the merits of 
the case. Certification procedures based on Eisen or Falcon often 
appear in securities class actions, which litigants usually bring under 
Rule 10b-5 and base on the fraud-on-the-market theory. Eisen’s and 
Falcon’s holdings influence securities class actions because courts rely 
on them to determine the proper class certification procedure. This 
Note argues that the apparent tension between the two cases has 
provided courts with the flexibility to consider just the right amount of 
evidence during class certification proceedings, permitting them to 
efficiently certify the proper class. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1980s, opposing attorneys have used Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin1 and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. 
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 1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
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Falcon2 to battle over the proper class certification process in 
securities class action lawsuits. In one corner, Eisen focuses on the 
interest of efficiency, holding that courts should not use a certification 
determination as a pretext for disposing of a plaintiff’s claim on the 
merits.3 Courts following this approach do not consider substantive 
issues at the certification stage and instead resolve these issues only 
after full discovery.4 In the other corner, in Falcon, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the important effect the class certification decision 
could have on the outcome of a case and held that courts may go 
beyond the pleadings and consider relevant evidence on the merits 
during class certification proceedings.5 Courts following this approach 
may examine all facts relevant to a class certification decision.6 Under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides 
guidelines for class actions, courts must certify classes of plaintiffs 
seeking to file a class action lawsuit.7 Eisen and Falcon greatly impact 
securities class actions because courts use these contrasting holdings 
to determine the proper class certification procedure. Given that 
parties normally either settle class actions if the class is certified or 
abandon the case without trial if class certification is denied, how 
courts decide certification often determines the case’s outcome.8 A 
court’s approach to class certification, therefore, has a significant 
economic impact; the average class action settlement in 2007 was over 
$33 million.9 
 
 2. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 3. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177, 185. 
 4. See id. at 177 (“We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a 
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”); see also, e.g., In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] motion for class 
certification is not an occasion for examination of the merits of the case.” (quoting Caridad v. 
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
 5. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 (“[T]he class determination generally involves 
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause 
of action.” (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978))). 
 6. Id.; see also, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 
167–69 (3d Cir. 2001) (following this approach). 
 7. See infra note 28. 
 8. See, e.g., Newton, 259 F.3d at 164 (suggesting that a certification denial can end the case 
and a successful certification can coerce settlement). But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to 
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (2003) (rebutting the 
assertion that “class actions force defendants into ‘blackmail settlements’” (quoting Henry 
Friendly, C.J., United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)). 
 9. STEPHANIE PLANCICH, BRIAN SAXTON & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS: FILINGS RETURN TO 2005 
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In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation10 provides a 
good example of class determination and its potential effect on the 
outcome of a case. In that case, merchants and trade associations 
accused Visa and MasterCard of conspiring to monopolize the debit-
card market and charge excessive fees.11 The Second Circuit followed 
Eisen12 and certified a class consisting of “all persons and business 
entities who have accepted Visa and/or MasterCard credit cards”13 
without allowing the parties to introduce evidence relating to the 
merits of the case during the class certification proceeding.14 The 
dissent’s warning that a possibly erroneous certification order may 
“coerce settlement”15 was consistent with the final result in this case, 
as the defendants settled before a verdict16 after the circuit court 
affirmed in favor of certification.17 The Third Circuit later took an 
approach similar to Falcon’s, holding that “[i]n reviewing a motion 
for class certification, a preliminary inquiry into the merits is 
sometimes necessary to determine whether the alleged claims can be 
properly resolved as a class action.”18 Despite court uncertainty over 
the proper scope of review when certifying class actions, this Note 
argues that the conflicting approaches the Supreme Court has 
endorsed coexist usefully and provide lower courts with the flexibility 
they need to balance judicial economy against fully developing 
disputed issues. 
The divergence in class certification often appears in class actions 
involving securities fraud, which litigants usually bring under Rule 
10b-5 and base on the fraud-on-the-market theory. Rule 10b-5 
prohibits any fraudulent statement or omission in connection with the 
 
LEVELS AS SUBPRIME CASES TAKE OFF; AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS HIT NEW HIGH 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.nera.com/image/BRO_Recent_Trends_12-07_web_3_FINAL.pdf. 
 10. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 11. Id. at 129–31. 
 12. Id. at 133. 
 13. Id. at 131 (quoting the plaintiffs’ motion). 
 14. Id. at 135. 
 15. Id. at 148 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“Rule 23(f) was adopted in part to alleviate the 
danger that an erroneous ‘order granting certification’ may force a defendant ‘to settle rather 
than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of ruinous liability.’” (quoting 
FED R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note)). 
 16. Robert B. McCaw & Robert W. Trenchard, Bring in the Experts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 
2007, at S4. 
 17. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d at 145. 
 18. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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purchase or sale of any security19 and remains one of the broadest 
bases for bringing an action alleging fraud in a securities transaction.20 
The fraud-on-the-market theory facilitates Rule 10b-5 class actions by 
stating that individual plaintiffs need not be personally aware of the 
defendant’s fraudulent statements or omissions.21 
This Note explores how courts resolve conflicting interests that 
arise when deciding whether to grant certification of a class asserting 
claims under Rule 10b-5. Part I discusses Eisen and Falcon’s differing 
approaches to class certification under Rule 23 and the fraud-on-the-
market theory, which has given rise to cases that have enunciated the 
Eisen-Falcon tension. Part II shows how the evolution of Rule 10b-5 
class action litigation has affected class certification. As Rule 10b-5 
cases have increasingly involved complex market efficiency analyses 
and required more expert testimony, judges have enjoyed greater 
discretion to decide what evidence to consider during class 
certification. Part III looks in detail at securities class actions that 
have been decided since the enactment of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),22 focusing on the synthesis 
of Eisen and Falcon achieved in In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities 
Litigation23 and In re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation.24 
Part IV concludes that the apparent tension between the two lines of 
cases has served as an important resource for courts, providing 
 
 19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). Courts have recognized a private remedy for violating 
Rule 10b-5. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). This private litigation is “‘a most effective weapon 
in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and . . . ‘a necessary supplement to Commission 
action.’” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quoting J.I. 
Chase Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). 
 20. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971) (stating 
that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of 
fraud, or present a unique form of deception” (quoting A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 
393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967))). Following the enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), these provisions may be the sole means for investors redressing 
their injuries through a class action. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 
126 S. Ct. 1503, 1507 (2006) (interpreting statutory federal preemption of state law securities 
claims broadly). 
 21. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 250 (1988). 
 22. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 23. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 24. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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flexibility for deciding issues in securities class actions that a simple, 
bright-line rule could not have resolved. 
I.  THE EISEN-FALCON FRAMEWORK AND FRAUD ON THE MARKET 
The holdings in Eisen and Falcon play an important role in 
securities class actions because courts rely on them for guidance when 
determining the proper class certification procedure. This Part 
describes Rule 23’s class certification procedures under Eisen’s and 
Falcon’s differing interpretations. These differences are most evident 
in class actions involving the fraud-on-the-market theory, which was 
developed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.25 This Part explores the rise of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory in securities class actions and reviews 
how courts apply Eisen and Falcon to these cases. 
A. Class Certification Procedures under Eisen and Falcon 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits multiple 
plaintiffs to “aggregate their claims in a manner that makes litigation 
cost-beneficial.”26 Rule 23 is a specialized area of federal procedure 
that involves a number of unique, overlapping, and sometimes 
conflicting rules and judicial doctrines. For a case to proceed as a 
class action, the court must certify “at an early practicable time”27 that 
the class meets the requirements of Rule 23.28 Therefore, courts must 
 
 25. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 229, 241–49 (1988). 
 26. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class 
Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 75 (2007). 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
 28. Id. To certify a class of plaintiffs, Rule 23 requires that 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
Id. 23(a). In addition, at least one of three additional conditions in Rule 23(b)(1) through (3) 
must be met. Parties seeking certification must show either that (1) adjudicating individual 
actions might create inconsistent standards or impair the rights of nonparties to protect their 
interests, (2) injunctive relief is appropriate for the class, or (3) common questions of law or fact 
predominate over questions affecting individual class members (the “predominance 
requirement”) and the class action is a superior method for adjudicating the controversy (the 
“superiority requirement”). Id. 23(b)(1)–(3). Rule 23(b)(3), which requires in part that common 
questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting individual class members, is the 
most common ground on which classes of shareholders seek certification in federal securities 
cases. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 461 (2006) (“Certification of shareholder fraud cases is almost always 
sought under FRCP 23(b)(3) . . . .”). The primary remedy plaintiffs seek in securities law class 
actions is often monetary damages, whereas (b)(1) and (b)(2) are intended for other purposes. 
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hold class certification hearings prior to full trials on the merits. Eisen 
and Falcon both interpreted Rule 23 and provided contrasting 
procedures for class certification hearings. 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin involved a class action alleging 
antitrust and securities law violations arising from pricing practices of 
securities brokers in odd-lot transactions.29 Morton Eisen charged two 
brokerage firms with monopolizing odd-lot trading and charging 
excessive fees.30 The brokerage firms allegedly “controlled ninety-
nine percent of the odd-lot business [and] illegally fixed the odd-lot 
differential charged to the investing public at an excessive level in 
violation of the federal antitrust laws.”31 In 1972, the trial court 
determined that the plaintiff was “more than likely” to prevail and 
therefore allocated 90 percent of the cost of giving notice of the 
action to the approximately six million prospective class members to 
the defendant.32 In 1973, the court of appeals “ordered the suit 
dismissed as a class action.”33 In 1974, the Supreme Court upheld the 
court of appeals, deciding that a trial court should not conduct “a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine 
whether it may be maintained as a class action.”34 This approach is 
sometimes called the “Eisen rule.”35 
The Court stated two reasons for the Eisen rule. First, it found 
no authority in Rule 23 for a merits inquiry at the certification stage, 
stating that the inquiry would be “directly contrary to the command 
of subdivision (c)(1)” that the class determination occur “[a]s soon as 
practicable”36 after the action commences.37 Second, it feared that 
 
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Subsection (b)(2) was never 
intended to cover cases like the instant one where the primary claim is for damages, but it is 
only applicable where the relief sought is exclusively or predominantly injunctive or 
declaratory.”), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Crasto v. Estate of Kaskel, 63 F.R.D. 18, 21 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Numerous courts have held that class actions under the securities laws are 
not appropriate for class action treatment under (b)(1).”). 
 29. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 159–60. 
 30. Id. at 160. 
 31. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Eisen, 417 U.S. 156 (No. 73-203), 1973 WL 172430. 
 32. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 168 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
 33. Id. at 169. 
 34. Id. at 177. 
 35. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 495 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (using the term 
“Eisen rule”). 
 36. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. The “as soon as practicable” requirement was introduced into 
Rule 23 in 1966 to prevent a situation in which putative class members in a particular class 
action would know the outcome of the case before having to choose whether to opt in. See Am. 
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defendants could suffer prejudice from a preliminary proceeding that 
determined a merits issue without the protections of “traditional rules 
and procedures applicable to civil trials.”38 This preliminary decision 
could “color the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden 
on the defendant.”39 Therefore, Eisen aimed to maximize efficiency by 
preventing courts from reaching the merits during a separate, 
preliminary minitrial before the parties have developed their cases. 
If applied too literally and broadly, the Eisen rule could impede 
the adjudicative process. “In some cases, federal judges invoke the 
rule to ignore merits-related evidence and to facilitate certification. In 
other cases, judges profess fidelity to the rule while selectively 
violating it in practice. The result is a patchwork of discretionary 
decisions difficult to justify on principled grounds.”40 Recognizing the 
importance of certification decisions, some courts have refused to 
base decisions on inadequate records unless the parties have the 
opportunity to argue the merits.41 
General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon definitively 
rejected reaching the merits prematurely. Falcon was an employment 
discrimination suit brought on behalf of a class of people who were 
 
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“[T]he potential for so-called ‘one-way 
intervention’ [] aroused considerable criticism upon the ground that it was unfair to allow 
members of a class to benefit from a favorable judgment without subjecting themselves to the 
binding effect of an unfavorable one. The 1966 amendments were designed . . . to assure [sic] 
that members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by 
all subsequent orders and judgments.” (footnote omitted)). 
 37. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177–78. 
 38. Id. at 178. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1254 (2002). 
 41. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1312 (4th Cir. 1978) (“An intelligent decision 
on class certification requires ‘at least a preliminary exploration of the merits’ of the plaintiff’s 
claim.” (quoting ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW ON FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 15 (1977))). Commentators have expressed three different criticisms of 
the Eisen rule. See Bone & Evans, supra note 40, at 1319 (“[A] careful examination of the costs 
and benefits favors abolishing the rule and replacing it with a rigorous review of the evidence 
and a preliminary evaluation of the merits at the certification stage.”); Bartlett H. McGuire, The 
Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the 
Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 403 (1996) (“For more than two decades, the Supreme Court’s dictum in 
Eisen has made it difficult for the courts to assess the merits in the course of their class action 
analyses.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 51, 87 (2004) (“The strong-form interpretation of Eisen, under which a trial court may 
not conduct a reasoned inquiry into merits issues as they relate to class certification, cannot be 
justified under any plausible analysis of public policy.”). 
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denied promotions based on their national origin.42 General 
Telephone hired Mariano S. Falcon through a special recruitment 
program for minorities.43 Falcon accepted two promotions but refused 
a third promotion.44 He later applied for a different position but was 
denied in favor of several white employees with less seniority.45 
Falcon filed a claim, alleging that he was “passed over for promotion 
because of his national origin and that [General Telephone’s] 
promotion policy operated against Mexican-Americans as a class.”46 
In 1978, the district court certified a class of Mexican-American 
applicants at General Telephone,47 and in 1980 the court of appeals 
upheld the certification order.48 Reversing the certification order, the 
Supreme Court in 1982 found that if the issues are not 
plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the interests 
of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the named 
plaintiff’s claim . . . [it is] necessary for the court to probe behind the 
pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question. . . . 
[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains . . . 
indispensable.49 
Courts could certify a class only if the “trial court is satisfied, after a 
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been 
satisfied.”50 Therefore, Falcon’s justification was based on ensuring 
the correct outcome of the class certification decision. 
Courts have managed to balance Eisen and Falcon’s two 
independent demands by requiring an “[i]ntertwining of class action 
inquiry with merits inquiry.”51 Courts have dealt with the advantages 
and disadvantages of the Eisen rule pragmatically and flexibly. 
Although they have sometimes refused to hold a “mini-trial[] into the 
merits,” courts have developed class certification evidentiary 
procedures.52 Courts have provided a “full opportunity to develop a 
record containing all the facts pertaining to the suggested class and its 
 
 42. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 150 (1982). 
 43. Id. at 149. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 152. 
 48. Id. at 155. 
 49. Id. at 160 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 50. Id. at 161. 
 51. Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274–75 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 52. Id. at 275. 
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representatives,”53 which can include preparation of memoranda,54 
affidavits,55 discovery,56 and hearings.57 Such procedures are not always 
necessary in Rule 23 determinations;58 however, the failure to use one 
when necessary59 is a reversible error.60 In summary, courts have 
varied their application of Rule 23 depending on the facts of 
particular cases. 
B. Rule 10b-5 and Fraud on the Market 
The Eisen-Falcon framework is especially important to cases in 
which the class certification hearing is complicated and potentially 
requires an inquiry into the merits of the case. Cases involving Rule 
10b-5 often include these complications. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), acting under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,61 promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it 
unlawful for any person “[t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
 
 53. Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259, 1268 (4th 
Cir. 1981). 
 54. See Crawford v. W. Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1304 (5th Cir. 1980) (indicating that the 
district court considered memoranda both parties had submitted when deciding the class 
certification issue). 
 55. See Chateau de Ville Prods., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 586 F.2d 962, 
964 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding a three-and-a-half page affidavit inadequate). 
 56. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1982); Stastny, 628 F.2d at 277 
n.16 (explaining that the judge’s discovery orders can help in Rule 23 determinations); Chateau 
de Ville Prods., 586 F.2d at 966 (holding that a failure to allow discovery when “substantial 
factual issues relevant to certification” exist was improper). 
 57. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir. 1974). 
 58. See, e.g., Int’l Woodworkers of Am., 659 F.2d at 1268 (stating that trial courts do not 
need to conduct a hearing to decide every class certification motion). Some opinions have 
suggested that there were rules either requiring, Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 
1977), or prohibiting, Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maint. Corp., 574 F.2d 656, 661 n.15 (2d 
Cir. 1978), inquiries into certification. The better reading of Eisen and the cases that invoke its 
rule, however, is that courts must require inquiries only to the extent the record for a 
certification determination is inadequate. 
 59. See Bradford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 673 F.2d 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining 
that a hearing usually is necessary “when a serious question of commonality, or any other 
essential element, is raised”). A court, however, could initiate such an inquiry on its own. See, 
e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Lacking [sufficient information 
to determine class certification,] the court may request the parties to supplement the pleadings 
with sufficient material to allow an informed judgment . . . .”). 
 60. See, e.g., Chateau de Ville Prods., 586 F.2d at 966 (reversing the district court for 
prematurely certifying a class action after the trial court failed to develop a sufficient 
evidentiary record). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
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make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading.”62 Although defendants can 
contest any element of the 10b-5 claim, defendants most frequently 
challenge plaintiffs’ proof of reliance.63 The reliance requirement 
assesses the connection between the defendant’s misrepresentation or 
omission and the plaintiff’s decision to buy or sell the defendant’s 
security.64 Because Rule 23 requires putative class plaintiffs to prove 
that potential defenses are common to all class members, defendants 
can argue that, without proof that every class member personally 
relied on the defendant’s statement or omission, courts should refuse 
to certify proposed classes. Consequently, courts could reject nearly 
all proposed securities class actions under the reliance element. 
When this problem first arose, many lower federal courts 
produced various formulations of the circumstances under which 
courts may dispense with proof that individual investors relied on the 
alleged misstatements or omissions in 10b-5 actions.65 Economists 
then developed the efficient market theory to explain how 
information unknown to some investors affects the prices those 
investors pay for securities traded on securities markets.66 According 
to this theory, securities traded on an efficient market incorporate all 
 
 62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
 63. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (“[Rule 10b-5’s] action’s 
basic elements include: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a 
wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance, often 
referred to . . . as ‘transaction causation[]’; (5) economic loss; and (6) ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a 
causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” (citations omitted)). 
 64. The Court refined the concept of reliance under Rule 10b-5 in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In Affiliated Ute, the Court found proof of reliance 
unnecessary in a Rule 10b-5 action “involving primarily a failure to disclose.” Id. at 153. The 
case involved Indian tribe members who had been induced to sell shares representing interests 
in tribal assets. Id. The Court found that certain employees of a bank transfer agent had a duty 
of disclosure regarding matters affecting share value. Id. The tribe members were not required 
to prove reliance on what might have been disclosed. Id. at 153–54. This decision produced a 
great divide between omission cases, in which courts presume reliance from the materiality of 
the omitted fact, and misstatement cases, in which no presumption arises. By relieving plaintiffs 
of the burden of proving individual reliance, courts have allowed the element of reliance to 
adapt to modern economic theories. 
 65. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[The] causal nexus can 
be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the common sense 
that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially 
inflated stock.”). A description of these developments is set forth in Jeffrey L. Oldham, 
Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1004–11 (2003). 
 66. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 553 (1984). 
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publicly known information into their price.67 In Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, the Supreme Court decided that courts should apply the 
efficient market theory in securities cases:68 
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in 
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s 
stock is determined by the available material information regarding 
the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will 
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not 
directly rely on the misstatements.69 
The Court adopted a version of the theory that justifies a 
presumption of reliance70 if the plaintiff shows certain factors, 
including “that the shares were traded on an efficient market.”71 
The issue of reliance arose in Basic as part of the district court’s 
decision to certify a class of plaintiffs under Rule 23. The plaintiffs 
included shareholders who had sold their stock in the defendant 
corporation during a certain period, allegedly because they relied on 
prior fraudulent denials by management that the company was 
negotiating a prospective merger.72 Affirming the district court’s class 
certification decision, the Court agreed with the district court’s 
assessment that the presumption of reliance provided a “practical 
 
 67. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An 
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1079 (1990) (arguing that 
the Supreme Court in Basic adopted the “all publicly known information” form of the fraud-on-
the-market theory). 
 68. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Indeed, nearly every court that has 
considered the proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have 
been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of 
individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.”). 
 69. Id. at 241–42 (omission in original) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 
1986)). 
 70. Id. at 250. The presumption is rebuttable. Id. 
 71. Id. at 248 n.27. The Court quoted the Sixth Circuit opinion’s assertion that, to secure 
the benefit of the presumption, the plaintiff must both allege and prove 
(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the 
misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on an efficient 
market; (4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to 
misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares between 
the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed. 
Id. (quoting Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988)). As this quotation suggests, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving these 
elements, consistent with the usual burden of proof in class certification matters. See 
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459, 463 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that the 
party requesting a class action must show that Rule 23 requirements are satisfied). 
 72. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228. 
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resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of 
proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites 
of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.”73 
Basic shows how proving reliance for a Rule 10b-5 claim and 
concurrently satisfying the various certification issues under Rule 
23(b)(3) present problems for plaintiffs.74 The district court noted 
that, if each member of the class had to prove reliance separately, 
“individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”75 
This outcome, with many shareholders suffering losses too small to 
justify an individual suit but large enough in the aggregate for a group 
effort, would have created a “loophole” in the class action remedy.76 
In light of this concern, the Court’s decision to adopt the fraud-on-
the-market theory, permitting a common proof of reliance to satisfy 
the predominance requirement,77 amounted to a “policy decision to 
promote the deterrence effect of private rights of action under the 
securities laws.”78 
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson removed a significant barrier to Rule 
10b-5 class actions. Yet the opinion is not an unqualified endorsement 
of expanded access to federal remedies. The Court seemed content 
that lower courts would sort out substantive and procedural issues—
including what proof plaintiffs must show to invoke the theory and 
whether Eisen limits the need to submit those proofs at the 
certification stage—on an ad hoc basis, even if the Court’s lack of 
guidance permitted courts to turn away a substantial number of 
claims. Thus, the fundamental policy underlying Basic may be 
characterized as one favoring judicial flexibility and the exercise of 
 
 73. Id. at 242 (alteration in original). 
 74. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“In order to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish 
that ‘the issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to 
the class as a whole, . . . predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized 
proof.’” (omission in original) (quoting Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 
1233 (11th Cir. 2000))). 
 75. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242. 
 76. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 28, at 457; see also Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552, 
553–54 (D. Mass. 1988) (“Courts have expressed a general preference for class certification in 
securities fraud cases, based on a policy favoring enforcement of the federal securities laws, and 
recognition of the fact that class actions may be the only practicable means of enforcing 
investors’ rights.” (citations omitted)). 
 77. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242. 
 78. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 28, at 458. 
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sound discretion. The Supreme Court was likely aware of the many 
post-Eisen, pre-Basic lower court decisions applying the Eisen rule in 
a spirit of procedural pragmatism and flexibility. The Court likely 
expected that future trial courts would sometimes look at the case’s 
merits when making certification decisions in fraud-on-the-market 
cases, as discussed in the following Part. 
II.  DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CLASS CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
SINCE BASIC 
Basic increased lower courts’ confusion over how much evidence 
to consider during class certification hearings. Because Basic did not 
explain how courts should evaluate plaintiffs’ proof of fraud on the 
market, many courts have permitted a variety of evidence during 
certification hearings, often in the form of expert testimony and 
relevant market data. But courts have had to decide how to evaluate 
this evidence in light of Eisen’s prohibition on considering the merits 
of a case and Falcon’s encouragement of rigorous Rule 23 
certification hearings. 
This Part describes two events that have eroded the Eisen rule. 
First, amendments to Rule 23 appear to promote more litigation 
during class certification hearings. Second, the number of issues and 
the complexity of evidence needed to address those issues have 
progressively increased, leading courts to increasingly allow parties to 
introduce and challenge expert testimony. These changes stressed the 
Eisen rule, but courts have used Falcon to adjust to these pressures 
and to effectively give pretrial certification decisions greater 
prominence in Rule 10b-5 actions. Two further factors, however, have 
restrained Falcon’s applicability to prevent it from replacing the Eisen 
rule: Congress enacted legislation that placed burdens on class action 
plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court set tighter standards regarding the 
use of expert witnesses. 
Two events have favored Falcon over Eisen, swinging the 
pendulum toward elaborate certification hearings. First, two 
amendments to Rule 23 invited courts to permit greater litigation 
during class certification hearings.79 In 2003, the provision that class 
certification “may be conditional” was removed.80 Without language 
permitting conditional class certification, courts cannot later modify 
 
 79. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 39 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 80. Id. 
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classes after certifying them, and so courts must be satisfied during 
hearings that they are certifying the right class. Additionally, the 
provision that courts should make class certification decisions “as 
soon as practicable” was replaced with a provision requiring the 
decision “at an early practicable time.”81 By providing courts some 
latitude when scheduling certification decisions, the amended rule 
potentially gives the parties more time to develop relevant evidence. 
Together, these amendments encourage greater litigation over class 
certification—putative class plaintiffs must be more persuasive when 
arguing that certification is proper, and courts may delay certification 
decisions to wait for more evidence.82 
Second, the evidence necessary to prove the elements of Rule 
10b-5 has become increasingly complex. The Supreme Court in Basic 
did not prescribe any single methodology for determining whether a 
market was efficient to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption.83 Lower federal courts, fed by insights from academics,84 
have endorsed a variety of ways to determine market efficiency,85 
sometimes through excursions into economic theory or expansive 
factual inquiries that went far beyond what sufficed in Basic.86 Thus, 
although Basic allowed a party to simply identify the market in which 
a stock traded as a sufficient basis for finding market efficiency,87 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. (“Two changes arguably combine to permit a more extensive inquiry into 
whether Rule 23 requirements are met than was previously appropriate.”). 
 83. See Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[Basic] offers 
little guidance for determining whether a market is efficient.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the 
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 912 (1989) (listing, as factors to determine a security’s 
market efficiency, whether the security is listed on a national exchange, whether it is actively 
traded, whether it is followed by market professionals, and whether the speed of its price adjusts 
to new information). 
 85. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Basic essentially 
allows each of the circuits room to develop its own fraud-on-the-market rules.”), vacated on 
other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). 
 86. The dissent in Basic had warned of complications, fearing that, “with no staff 
economists, no experts schooled in the ‘efficient-capital-market hypothesis,’ [and] no ability to 
test the validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel 
constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory.” Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., dissenting). 
 87. See id. at 247, 246–47 (majority opinion) (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the 
price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly 
available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material 
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”); 4 ALAN 
R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD  
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more often courts went further to consider multiple conditions 
believed to exist in efficient markets, some even considering 
quantitative measurements as to how the stock in question traded on 
that market. Cammer v. Bloom88 adopted a widely accepted five-part 
test for market efficiency that measures weekly trading volume, the 
number of securities analysts following the stock, the number of 
market makers in the stock, the company’s eligibility to file an S-3 
registration statement, and the stock’s record of quick price responses 
to events.89 The complexity of the evidence has increased the need for 
hearings to develop the evidence necessary to make these 
determinations, which has prompted litigants to use experts to resolve 
complicated financial issues and to challenge submitted statistical 
evidence.90 The Cammer factors are factual assertions that plaintiffs 
must prove in each case and thus pose a challenge if plaintiffs are to 
adhere to Eisen’s prohibition of inquiries into the merits of the case. 
Two separate factors have restrained Falcon’s applicability to 
maintain a balance between Eisen and Falcon. First, Congress 
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA).91 Remedies under Rule 10b-5 that are too readily available 
pose a danger to securities markets.92 When plaintiffs can easily 
obtain a remedy, the probability that defendants must pay damages 
increases. Unwilling to accept even a small risk of paying the 
enormous damages plaintiffs often claim, companies are forced to 
settle securities claims before trial for amounts disproportionate to 
 
§ 7:484 (2d ed. 2006) (“We think that, at a minimum, there should be a presumption—probably 
conditional for class determination—that certain markets are developed and efficient for 
virtually all the securities traded there: the New York and American Stock Exchanges, the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange and the NASDAQ National Market System.”). But see In re 
Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 138 (D.N.J. 1984) (“The trading on the over-the-
counter market may not constitute an ‘active and substantial’ market necessary to apply the 
fraud-on-the-market theory.”), rev’d on other grounds, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 88. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 89. Id. at 1285–87. 
 90. See infra notes 112–24; see also 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 87, § 7:484 
(“It is important to have a fairly simple way of resolving—at least tentatively—at an early stage 
in a case whether the market for a particular security is open, developed and efficient, since this 
affects whether a claim has been stated and whether a class may be certified. . . . [S]ome sort of 
evidentiary base is appropriate for class determination.”). 
 91. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 92. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., 
concurring) (stating that expanding such remedies “will lead to large judgments, payable in the 
last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers”). 
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their merit.93 In the years following Basic, skepticism toward the 
legitimacy of securities law claims was directed particularly at class 
actions.94 These perceptions led to the enactment of the PSLRA, 
which placed additional burdens on plaintiffs seeking recovery under 
Rule 10b-5, some of which were specifically directed at class actions.95 
Although the PSLRA did not specifically address procedures relating 
to class certification,96 court procedures eventually reflected 
skepticism regarding class actions that motivated the statute’s 
passage. Courts both invoked a narrow reading of Eisen and cited the 
PSLRA as authority for denying certification even when no express 
provision of the act compelled the denial.97 
Second, courts have imposed more stringent restrictions on the 
use of expert witnesses. The factual inquiries in certification hearings 
for Rule 10b-5 cases often require the testimony of expert witnesses.98 
Courts exercise a role as “gatekeeper” with respect to expert 
evidence.99 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,100 the 
 
 93. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975); see also In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting that defendants cannot 
“stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial”). 
 94. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730, 736 (criticizing “manipulation by class action lawyers” and “frivolous 
securities class actions”). 
 95. E.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101, 109 Stat. at 737–49 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–4, 77z–1 (2006)); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(6) (limiting 
class plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees to a “reasonable percentage” of recoveries). 
 96. Given the boost that the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic gave to class certification, 
it would not have been surprising if Congress had responded by legislatively reversing the 
theory. Basic marked the beginning of a period in which the filing rate of class actions tripled. 
Dunbar & Heller, supra note 28, at 529. An earlier version of the PSLRA would have reversed 
the fraud-on-the-market theory, but the SEC Chairman testified against this version. See 
Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and 
Finance of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 203 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt (“An actual reliance requirement of the type proposed 
would also make it virtually impossible for investors to assert their claims as part of a class 
action.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267–68 
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing both Eisen and the PSLRA when denying a class certification). 
 98. Absent Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, expert testimony, usually an opinion 
based on facts the expert has no first-hand knowledge of, would run afoul of the common law 
rule excluding hearsay evidence. See Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The 
Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927, 938 (1994) (stating that hearsay evidence is 
“evidence not directly perceived by the senses of the person giving the testimony”). 
 99. See Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 944 (1997) (noting that without a judicial check requiring consideration 
of contrary opinion, expert testimony could amount to “junk science”). Daubert requires judges 
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Supreme Court set ground rules for courts’ gatekeeper role, 
permitting a federal court to admit expert witness testimony only if it 
determines that the testimony consists of “(1) scientific knowledge 
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in 
issue.”101 The Daubert standard makes it easier for courts to reject 
expert testimony they deem unreliable.102 These standards force 
parties to litigate the quality of their experts before the experts can 
testify. Certification decisions should have the benefit of Daubert 
analysis to “eliminate both unreliable evidence and unsubstantiated 
class actions.”103 
The Eisen rule generally limits review of the merits of the case 
before certification of the class. Courts swung the pendulum from 
Eisen to Falcon by allowing complex evidence and expert witnesses 
during class certification hearings. Courts then restrained their 
application of Falcon, however, to find a balance between Eisen and 
Falcon. The Eisen-Falcon framework has proven sufficiently flexible 
 
to ensure that “an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the 
task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Daubert 
interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states that  
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and  
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 100. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 101. Id. at 592. The Court then set forth a nonexclusive list of factors that a court might 
consider when deciding whether to admit expert testimony, such as whether the expert theory 
or technique is subject to peer review and what its potential rate of error might be. Id. at 593–94. 
In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court articulated the court’s 
role in terms of a “gatekeeping” function applicable to all expert testimony, not just that 
relating to scientific knowledge. Id. at 141. 
 102. See KENNETH S. BROUN, ROBERT P. MOSTELLER & PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EVIDENCE: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 591 (7th ed. 2007) (“A Rand Institute study of civil cases concluded 
that since Daubert, judges have examined the reliability of expert evidence more closely and 
have found more evidence unreliable as a result.”). But see id. (“In contrast, admissibility 
standards in criminal litigation appear unchanged.”). 
 103. L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Note, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using 
Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1041, 1088 (2004); see also Mandi L. Williams, Note, The History of Daubert and Its Effect on 
Toxic Tort Class Action Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 208 (2003) (“A Daubert inquiry 
should be allowed in class action certification proceedings.”). The Supreme Court has rejected 
the argument that pretrial gatekeeping judicial determinations such as Daubert inquiries violate 
the Seventh Amendment. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2512 n.8 
(2007). 
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to both accommodate increased evidentiary burdens during 
certification hearings and allow courts to carefully screen cases before 
certifying a 10b-5 class action, as the next Part shows. 
III.  APPLYING THE EISEN-FALCON FRAMEWORK AFTER THE 
PSLRA 
Courts have increasingly insisted on a greater amount of proof 
regarding efficiency for the relevant security’s market before 
certifying a securities class action claim based on the fraud-on-the-
market theory. The quality of certification decisions that involve 
increasingly sophisticated economic theory can only improve if 
parties can explain and challenge the evidence of fraud on the 
market. Responding to this reality, lower courts have developed, 
through a case-by-case process, a pretrial certification procedure that 
conflicts with Eisen. As Part IV argues, Eisen and Falcon allow for 
this case-by-case balancing. This Part discusses the decisions in In re 
PolyMedica and In re Initial Public Offerings, which illustrate how the 
balancing process works. 
A. Securities Cases through In re PolyMedica 
In the wake of PSLRA’s enactment, courts have applied the 
Eisen-Falcon framework in various ways that increase procedural 
demands when deciding certification issues in Rule 10b-5 actions but 
that are difficult to explain through any single principle. Cases can be 
grouped into three categories: (1) those that apply Eisen and limit 
inquiries, (2) those that apply Falcon and permit broad inquiries, and 
(3) those that adopt a mixed approach.104 Courts still sometimes cite 
the Eisen rule as curtailing factual inquiries in challenges to 
certification motions in Rule 10b-5 cases.105 More often, courts take a 
mixed approach to applying the Eisen rule by incorporating the 
Falcon holding in view of the complexities of proving market 
 
 104. See Miller, supra note 41, at 55–61 (analyzing various class action proceedings in terms 
of “strong-form” and “weak-form” applications of the Eisen rule). 
 105. See, e.g., Lehocky v. Tidel Techs., Inc., 220 F.R.D. 491, 498 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (citing 
Eisen for the proposition that courts assume the allegations in a complaint are true for purposes 
of a class certification motion). Yet the court had actually conducted a hearing on market 
efficiency at which both sides submitted expert testimony and performed “sophisticated 
statistical tests,” id. at 506, and the court evaluated the evidence under Cammer standards, id. at 
505–09. Thus the curtailment effectively operated only to exclude the defendants’ offer of 
rebuttal evidence, which the court said was a matter for trial. Id. at 505 n.16. 
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efficiency and other elements of fraud on the market. O’Neil v. 
Appel106 illustrates this mixed approach. The O’Neil opinion suggested 
that Basic modified Eisen, at least to the extent necessary to permit 
procedures for adequately considering fraud-on-the-market issues.107 
The court’s consideration involved conducting a hearing108 during 
which the court tested the evidence against the Cammer standards109 
to determine whether market efficiency had been shown.110 The court 
recognized Eisen as a limit but did not hesitate to consider any 
substantive merits issues intertwined with the certification decision.111 
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts allow significantly 
more factfinding to determine market efficiency. In Krogman v. 
Sterritt,112 for instance, the court invited dueling experts to prove 
whether the relevant market was efficient.113 In Krogman, investors 
sought to certify a class in a securities fraud action.114 The investors’ 
expert testified that the average weekly turnover of the company’s 
stock was high enough to create a presumption that the market was 
efficient.115 The company’s expert testified that the investors’ expert’s 
calculations were incorrect and that the stock was not actively 
traded.116 The court agreed with the company’s expert that “the 
presumption of market efficiency, which would support an 
application of fraud on the market theory, [did] not apply.”117 The 
court denied certification because each investor would have had to 
 
 106. O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
 107. Id. at 497 (“By adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Basic court implied, 
though perhaps unintentionally, that the district courts must examine some of the merits.” 
(quoting In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1994))). 
 108. Id. at 494. 
 109. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 110. O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 500–01. 
 111. See id. at 500 (stating that “the court is not required at this point to decide the merits of 
plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market theory,” but “[o]n the basis of the evidence now of record, . . . 
plaintiffs have virtually no chance of succeeding on this theory”). 
 112. Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
 113. Id. at 474 (“[T]his Court must decide whether Plaintiffs have proven that the OTCBB 
market was efficient.”); see also Serfaty v. Int’l Automated Sys., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 418, 421 (D. 
Utah 1998) (“[T]he determinative question now becomes whether IAS stock traded in an 
efficient market . . . .”). 
 114. Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 470–71. 
 115. Id. at 474. 
 116. Id. at 474–75. 
 117. Id. at 475, 478. 
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prove individual reliance and therefore failed to meet the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23.118 
Additionally, in cases such as Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc.,119 
the court invited full Daubert challenges to expert testimony and 
excluded experts’ opinions based on Daubert considerations.120 In 
Ascendant Solutions, investors sought to certify a class in a securities 
fraud action.121 The investors proffered an expert to prove the 
company’s securities traded on an efficient market, and the company 
sought to exclude the expert’s testimony.122 The court applied 
Daubert, found the expert’s testimony unreliable, and granted the 
company’s motion to strike the testimony.123 Each investor would 
have to prove individual reliance, so the court denied certification 
because the investors failed to meet the predominance requirement 
of Rule 23.124 In circuits that had not yet specified procedures for 
certification hearings, the time was ripe for defendants to challenge 
the omission of these procedures.125 
In the First Circuit, defendants in In re PolyMedica challenged 
the district court’s class certification procedures.126 The district court 
had accepted the defendants’ argument that a “more searching 
inquiry” was appropriate in deciding class certification issues,127 thus 
rejecting a narrow reading of the Eisen rule and aligning this court 
with a majority of other federal circuits. Nevertheless, the district 
 
 118. Id. at 478. 
 119. Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV0166N, 2004 WL 1490009 (N.D. 
Tex. July 1, 2004) (mem.). 
 120. See, e.g., Bell v. Fore Sys., Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-1265, 2002 WL 32097540, at *1, *4 (W.D. 
Pa. Aug. 2, 2002) (mem.) (granting the defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of the 
plaintiffs’ expert on Daubert grounds); Ascendant Solutions, 2004 WL 1490009, at *3–4 (same); 
see also Miller, supra note 41, at 63 (“The fraud-on-the-market presumption in Basic cannot be 
intelligently administered without at least a preliminary look at the merits-related issue of 
whether the relevant market is efficient.”). 
 121. Ascendant Solutions, 2004 WL 1490009, at *1. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at *4. 
 124. Id. at *5. 
 125. Prior to the circuit court decision in In re PolyMedica, the First and Second Circuits 
were among those that did not provide for a full pretrial hearing of individual reliance evidence. 
See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating 
that a certification proponent need only show that Rule 23 requirements were met “based on 
methodology that was not fatally flawed”); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F.R.D. 27, 34 
(D. Mass. 2004) (“The First Circuit has not addressed the issue [of the level of inquiry for class 
certification] squarely . . . .”), vacated and remanded, 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 126. In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 4. 
 127. In re PolyMedica, 224 F.R.D. at 34. 
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court rejected the defendants’ further argument that courts should 
determine whether a market is efficient using a widely accepted, 
economics-based standard that prices must reflect “all,” rather than 
“most,” publicly available material information.128 The plaintiffs’ 
expert relied on the five Cammer factors and testified that the 
relevant market was efficient.129 The defendants’ expert relied on 
three factors not enumerated in Cammer and testified that the 
relevant market was not efficient.130 The district court found the 
plaintiffs’ expert witness testimony that the stock price in question 
reflected “most” publicly available information was sufficient and 
ordered certification even though the defendants provided evidence 
that the price did not reflect “all” publicly available information.131 On 
appeal, the First Circuit held that the district court improperly 
determined that market efficiency must reflect “all” such 
information.132 It therefore vacated the lower court’s order and 
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its 
opinion.133 At the same time that the First Circuit required this higher 
standard of proof, it also accepted the mixed reading of the Eisen-
Falcon framework that the lower court had adopted to permit 
considering evidence relevant to whether the higher standard of proof 
was met.134 The First Circuit held that “the district court must evaluate 
the plaintiff’s evidence . . . critically without allowing the defendant to 
turn the class-certification proceeding into an unwieldy trial on the 
merits.”135 The First Circuit’s friendliness to merits-related 
investigations permitted the district court to weigh competing 
evidence, including expert testimony regarding the Cammer factors.136 
The First Circuit then found that the district court was not permissive 
enough because the district court had rejected the defendant’s 
 
 128. Id. at 41. 
 129. In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 4. 
 130. Id. 
 131. In re PolyMedica, 224 F.R.D. at 43. 
 132. In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 13–14. 
 133. Id. at 19. The court rejected an even higher standard of “fundamental value efficiency” 
that would have required showing not only that the price reflects such information but also that 
it is accurate. Id. at 16. 
 134. Id. at 6. 
 135. Id. at 17. The court’s emphasis suggests that the First Circuit thought the scope of the 
trial court’s consideration of the merits was unacceptable rather than the fact that the trial court 
had reached the merits at all. 
 136. Id. at 4–5. 
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additional evidence regarding factors beyond those enumerated in 
Cammer.137 
The First Circuit acknowledged that abandoning a narrow 
reading of Eisen presents practical difficulties. It recognized that 
without a bright-line rule, defendants would always press the court to 
require more, and plaintiffs to require less, evidence of efficiency.138 
The First Circuit directed trial courts to keep these demands in 
balance through “broad discretion.”139 
Although the First Circuit’s guidance may seem overly general, 
on remand it inspired a better-focused rehearing by the trial court. 
The district court applied Daubert standards to its evaluation of the 
plaintiff’s expert testimony, found the testimony was only marginally 
persuasive,140 and admitted the evidence that it had previously 
rejected.141 This evidence proved relevant to the standard of 
“information efficiency” and to conclusively showing that it was not 
met.142 
B. The Second Circuit Joins the Party in In re IPO 
Shortly after In re PolyMedica was decided, the Second Circuit 
had a similar opportunity to rethink the Eisen issues in In re Initial 
Public Offerings (IPO) Securities Litigation.143 The In re IPO plaintiffs 
alleged “a vast scheme to defraud the investing public,” bringing 
claims under Rule 10b-5 and other securities laws against fifty-five 
underwriters, 310 issuers, and hundreds of associated individuals.144 
The defendants’ alleged scheme involved wrongfully requiring 
purchasers of securities in initial public offerings to commit to paying 
 
 137. Id. at 19. The rejected evidence included an expert report based in part on results of a 
“serial correlation test” and a “put-call parity test” that tended to show constraints on the ability 
of short sellers to trade on information relating to the stock in question. Id. at 18 n.21. This 
evidence, in turn, would have tended to show a limitation on the ability of market participants 
to exploit profit opportunities and would thus arguably have been inconsistent with the “all” 
information standard of market efficiency. Id. 
 138. Id. at 17. 
 139. Id. 
 140. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 270 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 141. Id. at 272–79. 
 142. Id. 
 143. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 144. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 293, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(“[T]he motions to dismiss are, for the most part, denied.”). 
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additional forms of compensation, such as purchasing additional 
shares in the aftermarket.145 
After having previously denied a substantial portion of the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the various claims,146 District Judge 
Scheindlin considered the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.147 
The defendants vigorously opposed this motion,148 submitting 
“thousands of pages of briefs, affidavits, exhibits and reports in 
opposition to the motion.”149 Judge Scheindlin was able to find in the 
record three items that were probative on the question of market 
efficiency: (1) the stock in question was to be traded on the 
NASDAQ National Market, (2) it was traded at high volumes, and 
(3) coverage by analysts and in the media was substantial.150 
Notwithstanding the subsequent amendments to Rule 23,151 Judge 
Scheindlin invoked the mixed approach toward the Eisen-Falcon 
framework and deferred definitive proof of certification issues until 
trial.152 Although she acknowledged the arguable relevance of broader 
tests of efficiency,153 Judge Scheindlin nevertheless concluded that the 
three items were sufficient under the “some showing” standard154 
established in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,155 which 
she believed to be the evidentiary standard at the certification stage.156 
Judge Scheindlin therefore granted the motion for class 
certification.157 
 
 145. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 27. The court saw the fact pattern as a 
continuation of long-standing securities industry practice of generating profits by artificially 
creating “hot issues markets.” In re Initial Pub. Offering, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 298–308. 
 146. In re Initial Pub. Offering, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (“Plaintiffs have pled a coherent 
scheme . . . to defraud the investing public. As such, these lawsuits may proceed.”). 
 147. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Six “test cases” 
were selected to determine whether the suits could proceed as class actions. Id. at 70. 
 148. Id. at 71 (“In their zeal to defeat the motion for class certification, defendants have 
launched such a broad attack that accepting their arguments would sound the death knell of 
securities class actions.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 107. 
 151. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 152. In re Initial Pub. Offering, 227 F.R.D. at 107 n.325. 
 153. Id. at 107 & n.323 (mentioning the five Cammer factors). 
 154. Id. at 107. “Under any conceivable test for market efficiency, these three facts are 
sufficient to meet plaintiff’s Rule 23 burden to make ‘some showing’ that the stocks in question 
traded on an efficient market.” Id. 
 155. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 156. Id. at 292. 
 157. In re Initial Pub. Offering, 227 F.R.D. at 122. 
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The Second Circuit reversed the certification order and aligned 
itself with the majority of other circuits,158 including the First Circuit 
post-In re PolyMedica, on issues including (1) using Eisen to limit the 
scope of class certification hearings,159 (2) the standard of proof in 
class certification motions,160 and (3) the standard for admitting expert 
testimony in these hearings.161 
The Second Circuit embraced a practical reinterpretation of 
Eisen for efficient market determinations that should help make these 
determinations more accurate. As to the first issue, whether Eisen 
limits class certification hearings, the Second Circuit undertook a 
“careful examination” of the Eisen rule before reaching its decision.162 
The court focused on the possible justification for the rule that a 
pretrial hearing of evidence could prejudice a defendant, but 
ultimately dismissed the justification as “fatuous.”163 The court also 
looked at the specific facts of Eisen, pointing out that the district 
court “had not looked at the merits in order to determine whether 
any one of the Rule 23 requirements was met.”164 In this light, the 
court concluded that Eisen did not mean that a party could avoid 
establishing a Rule 23 requirement whenever the Rule 23 issue 
related to the merits.165 The court thus joined the majority of other 
courts, requiring an appropriate Rule 23 determination even when 
the Rule 23 issue overlaps with a merits issue.166 
The Second Circuit then addressed the standard of proof 
plaintiffs must meet to prove fraud on the market during certification 
hearings. The court rejected Caridad’s “some showing” standard for 
proof in Rule 23 matters, stating that the standard was too low.167 
 
 158. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 38–39, 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(outlining the majority view, agreeing with this view, and reversing the certification order). 
 159. Id. at 33–34, 41. 
 160. Id. at 39–42. 
 161. Id. at 41–42. 
 162. Id. at 33. 
 163. Id. at 38 n.9. 
 164. Id. at 34. 
 165. Id. at 33. 
 166. Id. at 41. 
 167. Id. at 40. The court struggled to find a different standard. It cited without approval 
decisions in other circuits that held that parties seeking certification must establish Rule 23’s 
requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 29–30. The court then reexamined its 
own then-recent decision in Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Communications, 435 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 
2006), which had held that, at least for 23(b)(3) predominance, preponderance was the lowest 
possible standard. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 37 & n.8. 
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Instead, it concluded the proper standard was whether “discretion has 
been exceeded (or abused),” leaving the trial judge “some leeway.”168 
This decision added support to the First Circuit’s holding in In re 
PolyMedica, endorsing an appropriately flexible, discretionary 
standard that can respond to the expanding variety of issues 
presented by class actions.169 In re IPO urged, following from Eisen, 
that courts should exercise this discretion to avoid “a protracted mini-
trial of substantial portions of the underlying litigation” but should 
still use Falcon to demand enough evidence “by affidavits, 
documents, or testimony” to satisfy each Rule 23 requirement.170 The 
opinion balanced familiar concerns of each of these Supreme Court 
precedents, indirectly endorsing extensive evidentiary proceedings 
when considering class certification.171 
Continuing to apply a mixed approach to the Eisen-Falcon 
framework, the Second Circuit clarified the third issue regarding the 
standard for admitting expert testimony. The court held that expert 
testimony was not subject only to a limited Daubert standard 
requiring the testimony to not be “fatally flawed.”172 Instead, district 
courts should allow “statistical dueling” of experts and “assess all of 
the relevant evidence admitted at the class certification stage and 
determine whether each Rule 23 requirement has been met, just as 
the judge would resolve a dispute about any other threshold 
prerequisite for continuing a lawsuit.”173 
Notwithstanding its tolerance for inquiries into the merits of a 
case and statistical dueling of experts, the Second Circuit found that 
this particular case required no further inquiries or experts.174 This 
decision to close the record on efficiency could seem inconsistent with 
the court’s instruction to allow expert witnesses and evidence going to 
the merits of the case. Yet ordering more evidence would have been 
pointless because the Second Circuit concluded that initial public 
offerings are never an efficient market.175 The Court reasoned that 
 
 168. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 40 (noting that this leeway “is not boundless”). 
 169. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 170. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 41. 
 171. Although the court reversed her certification decision, the Second Circuit opinion 
reflects no disapproval of the extensive record that was developed in Judge Scheindlin’s court as 
to whether Rule 23 requirements were met. 
 172. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 36 & n.7. 
 173. Id. at 42. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
GROOT IN FINAL2.DOC 3/16/2009  3:25:37 PM 
1168 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1143 
“[t]he fraud-on-the-market ‘presumption can not logically apply when 
plaintiffs allege fraud in connection with an IPO, because in an IPO 
there is no well-developed market in offered securities.’”176 The court 
supported its decision by stating that (1) other courts had issued 
similar holdings with respect to initial public offerings, (2) SEC rules 
limited analyst coverage during such offerings, and (3) the plaintiffs’ 
own allegations showed that the market was slow to react once the 
truth of the fraudulent scheme became known.177 Therefore, the 
court’s decision indicates that more evidence is not always better than 
less and that courts must exercise discretion to distinguish whether 
the submitted evidence meets the relevant standard. 
IV.  A PROPOSAL TO EMBRACE DISCRETION 
Rule 23 establishes the procedures for certifying a class. Eisen 
and Falcon interpreted the rule, but in contrasting ways. Eisen 
interpreted the rule narrowly, precluding review of the case’s merits 
before class certification; Falcon allowed wide review of the merits to 
determine class certification. Analyzing the facts of the cases 
presented in this Note in the context of the Eisen-Falcon continuum, 
this Part asserts several ideas. First, it maintains that judicial 
discretion stemming from the contrasting holdings in Eisen and 
Falcon suits securities class actions. This Part demonstrates how the 
holdings in Eisen and Falcon complement each other to allow just the 
right amount of evidence into class certification proceedings to certify 
the appropriate class efficiently. This Part concludes by contending 
that the flexibility these two holdings allow is superior to the 
alternatives and will likely continue to assist courts in class 
certification proceedings. 
Scholars have praised judicial discretion during litigation, 
arguing that “judicial discretion does, in fact, lead to greater fairness 
and equality.”178 These commentators have argued for using judicial 
discretion in areas of law other than securities, including bankruptcy179 
 
 176. Id. (quoting Berwecky v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 197 F.R.D. 65, 68 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 177. Id. at 42–43. 
 178. Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 905, 
907 (2007). 
 179. See, e.g., Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 815 (2007) (“Congress should revise the means test to allow 
judges more discretion in identifying abusive debtors.”). 
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and criminal sentencing.180 Judicial discretion to use both the holdings 
in Eisen and Falcon seems particularly suited to Rule 10b-5 securities 
class actions. Rule 10b-5 securities class actions frequently involve the 
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory, creating the need to 
deal procedurally with large amounts of technical economic data in 
certification hearings regarding market efficiency.181 The theory has 
increased rapidly in complexity and importance since the Supreme 
Court approved the theory in Basic.182 This evolution toward 
complexity may continue, if not accelerate, as courts become more 
sophisticated in their understanding of the finance and thus require 
additional proofs before accepting economics-based presumptions,183 
and as securities lawyers develop useful economic tools to provide 
those proofs.184 Rules that govern securities class action procedures 
will benefit from flexibility that allows judges to deal with these 
changes without the need for detailed regulations that take every 
consideration into account. Though the complexity of class action 
securities cases has grown, the decisions established in Eisen and 
Falcon when applied together provide a framework to adapt to the 
increased complexity. 
The Eisen-Falcon framework influences procedure on two levels. 
The first is a prohibition against using certification as a pretext for 
ruling on the general merits of the case rather than only on specific 
certification issues.185 For example, a violation of this level may have 
existed if the In re IPO district court had invited submission of broad 
categories of evidence leading to a certification decision based on its 
belief that a violation of securities laws had been shown, or equally if 
the Second Circuit had based its reversal on the opposite view. The 
distinction between issues going to the merits and issues regarding 
certification is often hard to define, however. This framework then 
operates on a second level at which courts must make difficult 
 
 180. See, e.g., Barkett, supra note 178, at 907. 
 181. See supra Part II. 
 182. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 183. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 
2007) (holding that, in a fraud-on-the-market case, “loss causation must be established at the 
class certification stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence”). 
 184. See generally Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in Calculating Damages for 
Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 BUS. LAW. 955 (2007) (proposing an economics-based 
method to calculate damages for shareholder class action suits). 
 185. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974). 
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procedural choices about how to resolve those intertwined issues 
efficiently and fairly without violating the first-level prohibition.186 
Courts encounter many problems within the Eisen-Falcon 
framework when they deal with the substantive issues that determine 
the scope of a class. There is not a single procedure to determine how 
much expert testimony is necessary to competently judge class 
certification. Both sides in the suit would wish to bring as many 
witnesses and as much testimony to support their arguments as 
possible, swinging the pendulum toward Falcon from the judicial 
economy of Eisen. But without standards of a gatekeeper function to 
limit Falcon, the side with the greater resources would have an 
advantage. 
The courts have constructed rules that allow parties to introduce 
some evidence but still limit the Falcon tendency toward considering 
large amounts of evidence and remain somewhat close to Eisen. For 
example, courts have used the five Cammer factors to determine 
market efficiency.187 Through the Cammer factors, courts can allow 
plaintiffs and defendants to introduce some evidence but can limit the 
evidence only to that which is relevant to the five factors. 
Additionally, courts have applied Daubert’s gatekeeper analysis when 
deciding whether to allow expert witness testimony.188 By allowing 
expert witness testimony only when courts deem it reliable, courts 
have balanced Eisen and Falcon. 
By following Eisen, courts can certify classes quickly and begin 
considering the case’s merits. To ensure the certified class is correct, 
however, courts must use Falcon to consider some evidence during 
class certification. The continuum of Eisen to Falcon permits this 
flexibility—judges can use their discretion to emphasize Falcon if they 
need more information to refine the class or to emphasize Eisen to 
limit that inquiry when efficiency requires. 
Judges’ increasing tolerance for extensive certification hearings 
has shown the Eisen rule’s adaptability to these intertwined issues; 
indeed, during these proceedings, courts have found the presumed 
tension between Eisen and Falcon to be more apparent than real. In 
 
 186. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“Sometimes the 
[merits and certification] issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the 
interests of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff’s claim, and 
sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest 
on the certification question.”). 
 187. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
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re PolyMedica189 and In re IPO190 show that, to the extent tension 
exists, courts can resolve it. Both cases criticized precedents within 
their respective circuits that gave too little weight to Falcon and 
misread Eisen as directing courts to certify classes as long as the 
pleadings were formally adequate.191 Instead, the cases integrated the 
two Supreme Court opinions by accepting Falcon’s instruction that 
courts may examine the facts underlying a certification decision while 
also acknowledging Eisen by not allowing the inquiry to become a 
pretext for courts to reject plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.192 
Reading Eisen and Falcon separately, the cases appear to 
contradict each other. Eisen precludes review of the merits of the case 
before class certification; Falcon allows wide review of the merits to 
determine class certification. In practice, as subsequent court rulings 
demonstrate, the holdings of these two cases create a continuum 
giving courts flexibility depending on the facts of the situation. 
Courts’ continued, frequent citation of the two holdings over such a 
lengthy period, during which courts have often applied both cases in 
evolving areas of specialized securities law, suggests Eisen and Falcon 
were reasonably well designed to help courts during periods of 
transition and stress. The flexibility the two decisions permit has 
benefited the adjudication of class certification in securities class 
actions. These class certification hearings will continue to test the 
ability of judges to exercise sound discretion, but selecting one rule or 
the other, or some newly substituted rule, for courts to apply on a 
one-size-fits-all basis likely would not assist judges. 
 
 189. See supra notes 126–42 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra Part III.B. 
 191. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 34 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“Unfortunately, the statement in Eisen that a court considering certification must not consider 
the merits has sometimes been taken out of context and applied in cases where a merits inquiry 
either concerns a Rule 23 requirement or overlaps with such a requirement.”); In re PolyMedica 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Courts which choose to consider such 
fundamental value evidence at the class-certification stage run the risk of turning the class-
certification proceeding into a mini-trial on the merits, which must not happen.”). 
 192. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 41 (“[A] district court judge may certify a 
class only after making determinations that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met [but] 
in making such determinations, a district judge should not assess any aspect of the merits 
unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement . . . .”); In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 17 (“Exercising its 
broad discretion, . . . the district court must evaluate the plaintiff’s evidence of efficiency 
critically without allowing the defendant to turn the class-certification proceeding into an 
unwieldy trial on the merits.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Federal courts have undertaken a localized, circuit-by-circuit and 
case-by-case effort to establish standards for determining the 
sufficiency of claims invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory for 
class certification. This effort has proceeded on two fronts. One 
concerns the substantive question of what elements are required for a 
showing of market efficiency. The other concerns procedural 
questions of what standards of proof apply and when in the trial 
parties bring their evidence. The substantive question has attracted 
more academic attention than the procedural question. It continues to 
evolve in ways that cannot be predicted with certainty, though the 
fraud-on-the-market theory likely will continue to require more 
complex factual investigations. Although the related procedural 
question may seem of less intellectual interest, how it is resolved in a 
particular case can affect the outcome as much as, if not more than, 
the substantive question. Rule 23’s inherent flexibility and the 
Supreme Court’s contrasting decisions in Eisen and Falcon together 
give courts substantial discretion when deciding class certification—
and courts have seized that opportunity. Given the evolving nature of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Eisen and Falcon rules are both 
necessary and appropriate to adjudicating securities class action cases. 
Courts should preserve the Eisen-Falcon continuum. 
